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Abstract
Market research sources were used to initially gather primary technological problems and needs
data from non-aerospace companies in targeted industry sectors. The company-supplied
information served as input data to activate or start-up an internal, phased match-making process.
This process was based on technical-level relationship exploration followed by business-level
agreement negotiations, and culminated with project management and execution. Space Act
Agreements represented near-term outputs. Company product or process commercialization
derived from Lewis support and measurable economic effects represented far-term outputs.
Introduction
In an era of shrinking high-risk private sector research and development expenditures there is an
increasing dependence on government long-term technology development. Public to private
technology transfer is steadily becoming a critical, strategic component of U.S. economic growth -
both aerospace and non-aerospace.
NASA's mission is to develop aeronautical and space technologies and explore the frontiers of
space. It is also NASA's mission to actively seek out non-aerospace industries and companies
with technological problems or needs which might benefit from the transfer or application of its
special, state-of-the-art aerospace capabilities. Where it is within NASA's capability, the agency
will help companies eliminate shortages of knowledge or solutions, and possibly show the way to
technological competitive or strategic advantage. In this regard, NASA plays an important role,
along with other public sector technology producers, in contributing long-term, high risk R&D
inputs that help stimulate investment and growth in the U.S. economy. With respect to non-
aerospace technology transfer, the agency's Headquarters level "Commercial Development"
program is evidence of its commitment to the broader economy.
At present, U.S. public sector R&D expenditures are on the order of $60 billion. NASA's annual
budget of about $13 billion is a major fraction of the nation's total investment in R&D. NASA
Lewis 2 receives about 5% or around $0.7 billion of the NASA fraction to operate and fund its
aeronautical and space power, propulsion, communications, basic materials, and microgravity
fluids and combustion research and technology portfolio of research and development activities.
Lewis scientists and engineers have built and maintained strong relationships 3 with many
aerospace companies in order to accomplish its aeronautical and space technology development
mandate. Lewis has also continued to meet its parallel responsibility to transfer technology and
expertise to non-aerospace companies in order to provide a larger return on the U.S. tax-payers'
investment in aerospace technology.
1
The author is a member of the NASA Lewis Research Center, Commercial Technology Office.
2
Lewis presently has a population of about 1200 civil service and 1500 contractor scientists and engineers.
3 These relationships continue to be strengthened and redefined within the context of a new paradigm shift to a
government/industry partnership mode in the face of severe budgetary constraints in Washington, D.C.
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NASA Headquarters recently adopted a more proactive approach to carrying out its non-aerospace
technology transfer mission. NASA Lewis subsequently developed the CommTech
("Commercial Technology" Consultants) program 4 in accordance with the new agenda.
CommTech was designed to pro-actively engage the private sector in a manner which compresses
or minimizes public expenditures.
This paper presents a comprehensive review and assessment of the first (pilot) CommTech cycle -
from its conception and initiation (in October, 1994) and planned activities extending to the
present. The paper begins with an overview of the program's,; objective followed by an overview
of the input/output model. A description of the core development and implementation strategy is
presented next. This is followed by a presentation of the overall results of the implementation
phases. Finally, the program's performance and comparative metrics are summarized and
conclusions are drawn.
Goals and Objectives
The goal of this initial CommTech cycle was to demonstrate the potential low-cost/high
productivity advantages of a demand-driven technology transfer model. If successful, then this
"technology pull" approach could possibly complement or be a complete substitute for the
"technology push" methods that had been employed throughout the agency to date. In practice,
CommTech would apply a "company-led" strategy to systematically foster, track and measure the
establishment, development and execution of 1 to 2-year relationships between non-aerospace
companies and Lewis scientists and engineers.
In this regard, CommTech was conceived on the premise or understanding that:
• public to private technology transfer driven by private sector "market" demand (or pull) is
potentially more efficient and productive than traditional technology "push" approaches;
public to private, value-added technology transfer accrues best when public
technologies/capabilities are applied to private sector problems/needs whose solutions are either
limited or beyond current industry capabilitiesS;
• most companies that operate in non-aerospace industry sectors are generally unfamiliar with
NASA technologies and are not in the NASA/Lewis communications loop; and
• public sector entities operate under general policy guidelines that prohibit the offering of
services which are already supplied in the marketplace by private or privatized sources.
Based on all the above, CommTech was developed with the f:)ur-fold objective to:
1. Enhance Lewis' position as an accessible national technological resource for all tax-paying,
"for-profit" companies in the United States regardless of location;
4
CommTech was created in response to a new NASA Headquarters policy outlined in the document entitled "Agenda for
Change" in July, 1994. The agenda redefined the agency's responsibility to contribute to the commercial development of
all sectors of the U.S. economy. It stated that NASA now considered the (non-aerospace) "Commercial Technology
Mission" as "comparable in importance to those in aeronautics and space." The agenda was NASA's official response to
Clinton White House (and Congressional) policy guidelines.
s A good indicator of this would be the inability of a company to find private consultants or suppliers capable of solving
special problems that might arise in the course of new product/process development.
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, Pro-actively identify companies with product/process technology development problems/needs
that are beyond the commercial state-of-the-art, and which (to the best of a company' s and
Lewis' combined knowledge) have a low or zero potential of being met in the commercial
supplier marketplace;
. Increase the establishment of high quality non-aerospace technology transfer relationships via a
controlled, structured process with clearly defined near and far-term deliverables, including
clear program entry and exit-ways;
. Broaden participation in the Agency's non-aerospace technology transfer mission by providing
a clear structure which accommodates and supports the involvement of Lewis S&E's who
have not had the opportunity to participate.
Overview of Input/Output Model
Figure 1 illustrates the basic eight-step (two staged - explained in the next section) process used to
develop, start-up and operate the CommTech program.
(1) The NASA Lewis Commercial Technology Office 6 released a request to determine
product/process development problems/needs within specially targeted non-aerospace industry
sectors (companies). Market research intermediaries were used. (2/3) The intermediaries
conducted primary market surveys and (4) forwarded the results to the CTO (CommTech)
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Figure 1. Input/output start-up and operation process model
program manager. Surveys were designed to produce respondents with a high "match potential."
Care was taken to limit company expectations since it was known that the CommTech would only
accommodate the interests of a few company respondents (depending on the size of both the
companies' and Lewis S&E's responses) per cycle. (5) The survey results were then used as input
data for an internal Lewis activity that identified individual scientists and engineers.
6 Originally called the "Office of Interagency and Industry programs, Technology Utilization Office."
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(6) Interested S&E's admitted into the program proceeded to engage companies to further
understand their needs. If requested, CommTech funds were used (at the discretion of
participating S&E's) to demonstrate their capabilities to companies that were unfamiliar with
Lewis. Every effort was made to avoid subsidizing private s_,ctor commercial interests. (7) If
commercial potential was apparent, a company was expected to fund the transfer Space Act
Agreement mechanism needed to realize that potential. (8) The expectation was that companies
which participated would eventually produce and commercialize new (or improved) products or
processes. These would incorporate enabling or unique, state-of-the-art support and/or
technological contributions directly traceable to NASA Lewis.
Development and Implementation Strategy
CommTech development and implementation was conducted in two stages. Figure 2 portrays the
two staged process schedule and all necessary activities and deliverables. Stage 1 consisted of six
key activities and was directed toward the development, packaging and release of a program plan
and a four-part compilation (appendix) of company needs. Stage 2 consisted of four phases with
the ultimate objective to match specific company needs with Lewis capabilities and then establish
and execute agreements.
FY95 FY96 FY97
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Jan Sep Jan
Figure 2: Two-staged development and implementation schedule.
The four stage 2 phases were entitled: I - Response and Participant Selection, II - Company
Relationship Exploration, HI - Relationship Definition and Agreement, and IV - Agreement
Implementation and Execution. The estimated duration of both phases II and 11I had a built in
slack of about 3 months considering the inherent uncertainty associated with accomplishing those
objectives. Essentially, the rate at which a lead participant transitioned from phase II to phase HI,
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and then finally to phase IV, largely depended on a particular company's desired pace. In other
words, each company controlled when phase transitions occurred. Lewis scientists and engineers
did not. This was desirable since the program was fundamentally demand-driven or "company-
led."
Program Development - Stage 1
In stage 1, the objective was to deliver a program plan and develop an appendix of company needs
required to actuate phase I of stage 2. The program plan was designed to present a comprehensive,
end-to-end description of the program and stimulate Lewis scientists and engineers' interest in
participating. A three-part application was included within the plan for the convenience of any
prospective Lewis participant (scientist or engineer) to apply for entry. The appendix of company
needs (discussed below) enabled all interested scientists and engineers to apply and compete 7 in
phase I for entry into CommTech's key external interaction phases (II, III, and IV).
As a whole entity, NASA's Technology Transfer Network 8 surveyed (exhibit 1) over several
hundred companies to generate the raw data from which the appendix of company needs was
produced. Each network member was asked to produce "primary," market research data on
technology needs and other supporting business-type information on 45 companies from within
each of their respective regions. In addition, both business- and technical-level points-of-contact
were provided for each company. The network was responsive and largely successful, even
though most (the RTTC's) had never previously operated in this mode. Because of this, the
network's activity needed to be coordinated and guided by the CommTech program manager.
Specific industry sectors 9 were targeted as required and the network had the latitude to select its
own survey research method. Both written correspondence and telephone surveyS° instruments
were specially developed and employed. Written surveys provided a basic, comprehensive outline
of NASA Lewis' areas of technology expertise. This helped companies make a preliminary
assessments about Lewis S&E' s advanced aerospace technologies/capabilities - and increased the
"match potential." Companies then provided information about their special (proprietary or non-
proprietary) product/process development problems or needs. They also indicated which Lewis
technologies/capabilities areas they thought might best serve their interest (or be fruitful). All
survey results were forwarded to the Lewis program manager (in early February, 1995) after a
four month process. Following receipt of the raw data, a program plan and four-part appendix of
company needs _ (exhibit 2) n were finalized about a month later.
7
Phase I was competitive since a pool of limited funds (to be used only for technology/capability demonstrations) was to
be allocated to each applicant selected to participate in phase II.
8
The seven NASA Technology Transfer Network members were: Far West Regional Technology Transfer Center, Mid-
Continental RTFC, Southeast RTFC, Mid-West RTFC, Mid-Atlantic RTrC, Northeast RTTC, and Research Triangle
Institute. NASA Lewis issued an informal "Request for Information" to each member of the network to initiate the
process. At the time, all network members were contracted to NASA Headquarters to provide services to the whole
agency.
9 Three main industry sectors were specifically targeted in this first cycle: Environmental, Surface Transportation, and
Bioengineering. These industries were thought to have companies with high potential tech transfer synergies with Lewis
technologies.
10
Network members constructed their own survey instrument. The program manager coordinated some of this activity.
11
A small quantity of data inputs were received from the Northeast, Far West, and Mid-Atlantic RTrC's. These were
combined into the Multi-Region Supplement shown in exhibit 2.
12
Contained a total of 212 pages: 25 pages for the program plan and 187 pages for the complete appendix.
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Exhibit 1 : Basic survey content used by several NASA RTFC's. Companies were
furnished with information about Lewis capabilities to increase the "match potential."
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Exhibit 2: Cover sheet format used for the Program Plan and Appendix of Company Needs.
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Program Implementation - Stage 2
The implementation stage commenced (on March 24, 1995) with an intemal (electronic) release 13
of the program plan (and solicitation) and appendix to all Lewis scientists and engineers.
After receiving the program package in phase I, interested scientists/engineers responded by
completing the three part application (exhibit 3). The fn'st part of the application required
applicants 14to choose six _5companies out of the appendix of company needs. Applicants who
were presently supporting companies or had previously worked with companies on their own had
the option to enter up to three of those companies (i.e., if they fell into one of CommTech's target
industry sectors). As noted previously, the appendix enabled all Lewis scientist and engineers to
apply and compete in phase I to be part of an energized and committed assemblage of phase II lead
participants. The other two parts of the application gathered additional information to help gauge
each applicant's preparedness to participate, and the degree to which he/she might reliably commit
time toward completing the objectives of stage 2 - phases II and HI, and most importantly phase
IV.
In Phase H a virtual technology "marketplace" of potential buyers and sellers was ignited _6. At
this point, the choices of companies Lewis S&E's made in phase I became one of the more
important factors (among others) for success. The phase H participant's ability to quickly tune into
a company's particular (alien) non-aerospace culture, and communicate and follow through
effectively was another factor for success. Most importantly, a company's assessment of (and/or
ability to assess) the participant's proposed technology/capability match was critical. Even with
the maximum six companies to help reduce the odds, it was challenging for most Lewis S&E's to
complete phase II.
Each lead phase H participant was armed with market-need information (provided in the appendix)
about each of his/her chosen companies. Several participants selected some of the same
companies in phase I. It was therefore necessary to incorporate a high degree of inter-participant
coordination into phase II. This prevented Lewis S&E's from contacting companies in an
awkward, haphazard, or uncoordinated manner. To accomplish this, each participant was
informed about the specific company choices of all other participants that happened to coincide
with their own. Phase II was subsequently kicked off, and the virtual marketplace of technical-
level communications between Lewis S&E's and technical points-of-contact at each company
became active.
13 Program information package was released via LeRC's internal file tran_ fer protocol - the first use of FTP at Lewis for
large-scale (paperless) program information distribution.
14
During this phase I application process, all applicants were provided wi_ h company names and technology needs
descriptions - no specific names of technical points-of-contact were given to avoid any premature interaction. Applicants
qualified for phase II through the phase I process based mainly on a measurt and comparative analysis of the level of
commitment and interest contained in their application.
15
The choice of six companies was an arbitrary figure, neither too few nor too many, and was used to increase the
chances for success in phase II. The majority of applicants submitted required six choices, however a few submitted less.
16
It was originally intended that lead participants would travel and visit high potential companies at some point during
their phase II process. However due to the absence of travel funds, only teh;phone, electronic, and other non-physical
means were available. Hence the serendipitous "virtual marketplace" metaphor.
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Exhibit 3: Three-part application as it appeared in the Program Plan.
Phase II participants used the limited information provided in the appendix to understand their
companies' needs in order to prepare for an introductory conversation with the respective technical
contact points. The aim of this initial conversation was to quickly develop a more in-depth
technical understanding of a company' s product/process development needs - and vice-versa for
the company. The participant (together with his/her technical point-of-contact) used this deeper
understanding to make a rapid and accurate assessment of whether his/her particular technology
and/or capabilities might match a company's need. Capability demonstrations 17were provided at a
company's request if the lead participant thought the interaction held promise. Contacts were
made according to a sequential contact strategy to avoid raising (any company's) expectations that
could not be met. Therefore, when a match was found, the participant would cease his/her
17
A total of $230K was budgeted to support demonstration objectives in CommTech's three focus industry sectors.
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sequential contact process at that point. Further contacts were made only if the lead participant
were willing to assume the additional responsibility which w_uld result from the discovery of
another match.
Although phase II had a planned duration of 3 months, it was expected that in many cases it would
be necessary to extend this phase for an additional 3 months to allow slower-to-develop
relationships to coalesce. Similar reasoning was applied to phase HI.
After securing a "technical" match between technology need and capability (or demand and
supply) discussions shifted to the "business" level. In other words, phase II transitioned into
phase III. In phase II, those participants who were fortunate enough to discover a company whose
needs matched their capabilities proceeded to phase III. Those who did not, terminated their
participation in the program with a clear and measurable effort and contribution to show for it.
Phase III ended, on an individual basis, when a formal Space Act Agreement is was officially
signed by NASA and a particular company. This agreement represented NASA's legal obligation
to deliver specific technologies/support to that company at a specified cost and schedule.
Phase 111participants who successfully negotiated and established an (Space Act) agreement
transitioned into phase IV. 19 Here, the participant's ability to deliver on his commitment became
critical. The challenge all lead participants faced at this point was incorporating scheduled, non-
aerospace support obligations into their "higher priority" aerospace work schedules.
In addition to the success/risk factors mentioned with respect to phase II above, it was well
recognized that overall success during stage 2, in particular phase IV, depended largely on the
degree of relevance or importance each lead participant's functional manager attached to non-
aerospace interactions. This constituted an additional risk factor which, in several cases, may have
negatively impacted the performance and output of stage 2.
18
Non-contractual relationships established between NASA and private sector entities are defined as Space Act
Agreements in accordance with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act of 1958.
19
Phase IV had a planned duration extending through fiscal year 1997.
NASA/TM--1998-208496 10
Results of Implementation Phases
Phase 1: Response and Participant Selection
Twenty-six (26) scientists/engineers z° responded to the phase I solicitation. Of these, 16 applied as
individuals and 10 as teams. In addition, 9 applicants had experience in non-aerospace technology
transfer while 17 had no experience. These applicants selected a total of 73 companies to explore
in phase II of which 58 (or 79%) were chosen from the appendix, 21and 15 (21%) were included
by some experienced applicants. Figure 3 provides additional aggregate information on industry
sectors and regional sources.
25 Phase II Participants Identified
• 15 as Individuals, 10 as Teams
• 9 with EN't-r. And 16 without ENTT*
48 Total Participants
• Experience in Non-aerospace Technology Transfer
• 73 Companies* Selected
For Exploration In Phase II
• 58 Selected from the 142 in the Appendix
15 Brought in by Experienced Participants
• Surface Transportation Sector .... 37%
Environmental Sector .................. 36%
Bioengineering Sector ................ 27%
' Produced an average of 5 companies par Lead Partiooant
based on a total of 128 companies inCluding ovedappng selections.
Company Data By Region
Mid-West .............. 36%
Mid-Continent ...... 22%
South East ........... 19%
North East ............ 11%
Far West ............... 7*/.
Mid Atlantic .......... 5%
Company Data Sources
Rl"l'C's .......... 58%
RTI ................ 20%
S&E's ............ 22%
Figure 3: Summary of Phase I aggregate input/output results
Figure 4 portrays the virtual team arrangement tool which was used to coordinate and
display an evolutionary "cross-section" of phase II activities at any point in time. This tool
enabled coordination and tracking of the dynamic phase II, interactive marketplace process
(which was activated at the end of phase I). Lead participants (and their team members)
formed ready-to-engage points-of-contact for their chosen companies grouped around the
rim. The program manager was available to coordinate and provide strategic guidance as
needed.
2o One applicant applied twice making the actual number of applications 26.
21 This appendix contained 142 company technology needs profiles, and was produced primarily to enable applicants
without any previous non-aerospace technology experience to participate (and compete) in the phase I process.
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CommT_h
Management
Structure
Figure 4: Phase II virtual start-up configuration. Selected lead participants were arrayed outward to
illustrate an appropriate outreach posture with respect to the companies they chose. The program
manager was centrally positioned to interface directly each lead participant and provide strategic and
other facilitative support.
Phase II: Company Relationship Exploration
The mid-phase II (July 17, 1995) evolutionary status of the phase II virtual marketplace is shown
in figure 5. This picture was assembled about one month beJbre the 3-month phase II/III
transition milestone (refer to figure 2). By this date, some participants had already completed their
phase n explorations.
As shown, several (shaded) companies had been explored and eliminated by the respective lead
participants. Numerous (short) links are shown extending beiween each participant and their
respective company symbols. This indicated the establishment of a two-way communication
(voice mail messages were not considered valid communications) with those specific companies.
Once communications were established with a company, it was then allowed to assume significant
control over the pace, quality and final disposition of the inte:-action. A shaded company symbol
indicated that the company had been explored and eliminated due to the lack a need/capability
match. This was jointly determined through technical interchanges - as explained previously.
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CommTech Phase II
S&E Initiated Interactions
July 17,1995
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Figure 5: Virtual marketplace activity near the planned 3-month Phase II to Phase III
transition point. Company-participant and inter-participant communication links are shown.
Several (longer) links are also shown connecting various participants. This indicated that those
participants who had selected the same company(ies) for different reasons were coordinating their
interactions with those companies (inter-participant coordination interactions peaked around July 7,
1996). A shaded participant symbol indicated that that participant's activities had ceased after all
his/her companies had been explored without finding at least one need/capability match. In other
words, the companies were all contacted sequentially, and each indicated no current (or no further)
need for the participant's capabilities and offer of support.
Figure 6 portrays the cumulative totals and the various rates at which the scientists and engineers
initiated their company interactions during phase II. As shown, 125 out of a possible maximum
of 128 (or 98%) company interactions (the total count resulting from the overlapping selections of
the same company(ies) by different participants) were recorded by August 7, 1995. At the end of
phase II, eleven (11) lead participants 22had successfully established relationships which could be
transitioned into phase HI.
22
At the time this report was written only one newly admitted lead participant remained active in a phase I1 mode.
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Figure 6: A measurement of the amount of effort expended, and an indication of the rate at
which the effort was expended during phase II.
Phase HI: Relationship Definition and Agreement
The development and completion of technical-level discussioas varied widely from participant to
participant. As a result, the transition from phase II to phase 1II was managed on a case-by-case
basis since each participant progressed at a different rate due to differences in company
(organizational) interface structures. Out of the initial 26 lead participants who entered phase 11,
and the 11 who progressed to phase 111,four Space Act Agreements were established. Basically, 1
agreement was generated for every 6.5 participants that entered the program in phase I. These
agreements were as follows:
• Sonix, Inc. (Cooperative) - Development and Commerci_llization of Ultrasonic Thickness and
Surface Profilometry;
• East Ohio Gas Company (Reimbursable) - Underground Liquid Natural Gas Tank Test and
Analysis;
• Cleveland Clinic Foundation (Reimbursable, Interagency - Funded by the National Institutes of
Health) - Pump Design and Analysis Services for the Innovative Ventricular Assist System
(IVAS) study; and
• Cleveland Clinic Foundation (Non-reimbursable) - Liqui,l Crystal Shutter Glasses for the
Diagnosis of Functional Visual Loss and Malingering.
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In addition to the four above, two additional agreements were included in the phase III count:
• Essential Research, Inc. (Reimbursable) 23 _ Development of Optoelectronics Devices, Solar
Cells and Related Technology;
• Deere & Company Technical Center (Reimbursable) 24- Ammonia Distribution System
Characterization.
The Essential Research, Inc., agreement was not negotiated within the CommTech framework but
was admitted into the program as a phase IV project. The Deere & Company agreement
represented the last late (lead participant) entry into the program prior to preparing this report. This
agreement was developed and finalized according to CommTech procedures.
Although CommTech's main target was "for-profit" entities, two lead participants submitted the
non-profit Cleveland Clinic Foundation as one of their six company choices. This occurred
because of NASA Lewis' special emphasis on fostering relationships between its scientists and
engineers and local Cleveland-based companies - especially the world renown CCF. However, in
order to be measured as a CommTech success, the NASA/CCF partnerships would have to
involve for-profit partners at some point. In other words, the CommTech program's primary
focus remained profit-driven companies that needed NASA Lewis' technologies and capabilities,
and were able to produce and market new products and/or processes.
Phase IV: Agreement Implementation and Execution
As mentioned previously, it was expected that a large fraction of lead participants would not
progress from phase II to phase III. For that matter, even fewer were expected to progress from
phase III to phase IV. Figure 7 shows an estimate of the present, overall relative progress of all
participating Lewis S&E' s along the three-phased continuum. It must be emphasized that the lack
of success in phases II or III did not constitute failure. That is why one of the critical measures
used in recording CommTech's overall performance was the effort expended by all participants
during phases II and III.
Of the 6 phase III agreements highlighted earlier, 5 are currently on-going projects. Four of these
projects originated from the initial phase I participant group. These projects are being executed
according to their respective phase IV schedules. At the time this paper was written, three
agreements/projects had been completed: Sonix, Inc.; East Ohio Gas; and Cleveland Clinic (non-
reimbursable). Commercialization results are not yet available for these activities.
Performance Measurement Technique Formulation
As indicated earlier, tracking and measurement techniques would be devised in phaes IV. In that
regard, the private/public investment 25ratio was formulated to provide a future means of providing
cycle to cycle performance comparisons. It was found that it would be useful for the CommTech
program to have a single overall program performance metric that could be used as a general
performance indicator or index.
23 The ERI agreement was established prior to CommTech. The lead Lewis engineer was granted entry into the program
in a phase IV capacity. This relationship currently represents the most promising for-profit relationship in the CommTech
portfolio.
24 The agreement, which was initiated by John Deere Des Moines Works, was subsequently llansferred to Deere &
Company Technical Center for implementation in the Fall of 1998.
2s The author considers the terms "investment" and "cost" interchangeable in the context of technology transfer and
commercialization.
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The private/public investment ratio (PPIR) is written as:
PPIR = Ip,ivate / Ipublic
where:
I_v_t e = The total "private dollar investment" in one or more technology transfer and
commercialization objectives;
and
Ipublic = The total "public dollar investment" in one or more technology transfer objectives.
If the process of demand driven technology transfer and is considered a "production" process,
then Ir_va_ and I_b_c can perhaps be determined from the following two equations 26(the specific
functions represented by each term in each equation, along w_th the relevant or associated stage 2
phases, are given in parentheses below):
I_at_ = A +ftH1W, E Lh+fcHeWeX Ei+fpHpWpX Pj+fm Hm WmEMk
{I_ = Transfer (phase HI)+ Transfer (phase III)+ Transfer (phase II/IV)+
Transfer & Commercialization (phase IV)+ Commercialization (post phase IV)}
and,
Ipublic = n -I- fm tim Wm Z M k + fe He We Z E i -t- fl HI Wl Z L h
{Ir_b_c = Transfer (phase II)+ Transfer (stage l/phase I)+
Transfer (phase II)+ Transfer (phase III)}
where the stated "labor" and "capital .... factors of production" and their associated "price"
determinants are described by:
A = The private dollar amount committed to fund an established (Reimbursable or Cooperative)
Space Act Agreement;
D = The public dollar amount expended to provide a capability demonstration to a particular
company;
f(t, e,p, orm) = Inflation factors to adjust each term;
H(l. e, p, or m) '-- The number of hours needed to perform each of the key functions, respectively;
W(l, e, p, or m) "-- The hourly wage rates of each respective functional area (as a function of
government, company or industry origin);
26
The two equations are derived from the economic theory of production. The validity of this approach remains to be
demonstxated in practice. This will depend on whether the necessary input data will actually be provided by (any or all)
participating companies.
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L h = The number of legal personnel needed to establish the technology transfer agreement;
E_ = The number of engineering personnel needed to demonstrate and/or transfer the technology
(public and private); and/or to incorporate the transferred technology into a new or existing product
design (private);
Pj = The number of production personnel needed to actually produce the new or modified product
(private); and
M k = The number of marketing personnel needed to promote and introduce CommTech (public);
and, position and develop a promotion and pricing strategy for the new/modified product (private).
{Note: It was beyond the scope of the CommTech program first cycle objectives to gather all the
above investment data. As a result, a PPIR based on the simple "A/D" approximation (see Table
1), was determined only to serve as a rough point of departure or baseline. In the future, however,
detailed, individual and aggregate PPIR's would need to be estimated during Phase III, and then
adjusted and finalized during Phase IV.
It was understood that companies generally tended not to track unpatented/unlicensed technology
transfer from source to end product application and commercialization. As a result, a company's
technology transfer and commercialization process (cost) data tend to dissipate. Because of this,
the process data (above) would have to be acquired from a company during each relevant phase
(II, III, and IV). }
Results Summary
Table 1 displays a summary of the metrics resulting from each of the phases in stage 2. As noted
previously, the initial 26 phase II participants produced a participant/agreement ratio of 6.5 (based
on 4 agreements), or 2.2 with respect to phase III (based on 6 agreements). For all 6 phase III
agreements, the cost was $22K per agreement, or $26K per project, with respect to the total $130K
for demonstration expenditures.
The private/public investment ratio (PPIR) as described above was formulated as a key parameter
or metric by which CommTech could gauge and compare performance over time. This ratio was
designed to be a measure of the aggregate efficiency of the program - the higher the PPIR, the
greater the efficiency. A detailed, first CommTech cycle PPIR, however, could not be determined
since the methodology was developed as an output of this first CommTech cycle for application
with future cycles. Instead, a simplified approximation is calculated and given below as a rough
performance measure and basis for comparison with future cycles.
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1 Includes 3 new participants who entered the program in FY96.
2 Program was open to all NASA Lewis S&E's - 26 applications were submitted.
3 Eleven (11) from initial 26 phase II participants plus 2 later additions.
4 Market research cost estimate (NASA Headquarters (R'I-FC's & RTI) contract/task obligation).
5 Includes estimate on all fully negotiated, signed and unsigned FY97 Agreements.
6 Simplified estimate shown based on Private Investment/Public Investment data in Table.
7 Four (4) agreements were generated by the initial 26 phase II participants.
8 Includes estimate on all started and expected FY97 projects.
9 Based on 4 agreements (see note #7),
TBD: To be determined
Table 1: First CommTech cycle Stage 2 results summary.
Program Success Factors
Several key (CommTech) success factors were identified. Some were within the program's ability
to influence and control, and others were not. The success factors are meant to indicate what
factors were responsible for producing the results shown above. At the same time, they also
indicate what overall factors need to be considered and mitigated if possible in order to improve the
chances for better performance in future cycles. The main success (or risk) factors for each stage
are presented in figure 7 below. The scales to the right provide a quantitative estimate or measure
of the degree of control Lewis (as a whole) had over each success factor, relative to that of any
potential client company. The accompanying table 2 shows tae degree of (process) control for
each stage and phase of the program. Overall, the control fraction split was Lewis, 76 %, and the
company, 24 %. In other words, from the Lewis standpoint, the CommTech approach contains
about a 24% (inherent) risk, due to factors which were wholl3 or partly within the control of the
other party.
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Stage 1:
1. Market research source(s) effectiveness.
2. Company awareness of Lewis' availability.
3. Timing.
¢. Level of market (industry/company) demand.
5. Company perception of need/capability synergy.
6. Company responsiveness.
7. Program management degree and quality of engagement.
8. Agency/Center policy environment support.
9. Functional management support.
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Stage 2/phase I:
1. Level of S&E morale. 100I
2. Timing. loo,
3. S&E's perception of Agency, Center and/or functional management interest. 100j
4. S&E' s interpretation of value-added, loo,
5. Type of distractions/threats in the S&E environment, lo0 I
6. S&E' s level of attention and interest. 90r
7. Program plan quality and clarity. _oo=
8. Application forms quality and effectiveness. _oo,
L o
to
0
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0
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Stage ?./phase 1I:
1. Lead S&E ability to adapt and communicate with different companies.
2. Lead S&E commitment.
3. Time lapse between receipt of survey results and delivery to Lewis S&E's.
¢. Company interest.
5. Company willingness to give information.
6. Company ability to assess Lewis technology/capability applicability.
7. Program management strategic guidance.
8. Functional management support.
9. Availability of demonstration funds.
0
70 30
30 70
30 70
30 70
30 70
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Stage 2/phase III:
l. Lead S&E's schedule flexibility.
2. Lead S&E's ability to plan effectively.
3. Company schedule flexibility.
4. Program management negotiations support.
5. Functional management support.
80 1 _ i 20
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Stage 2/phase IV:
1. Lead S&E's ability to deliver - per agreed schedule and cost.
2. Company product/process development or market commitment.
3. Functional management support.
4. Program management support.
50 | J= z 50
15 z _ i85
90 z _, i 10
851 _ z15
Figure 7: Success factors and relative degree of control or risk indicators
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Degree of
Control -
LeRC
%
Degree of
Control -
Company
%
Overall 76 24
Stage I 79 21
Phase I 99 1
Phase II 63 37
@
o)
Phase III 72 28
Phase IV 60 40
Table 2: Summary of relative degree of process control or risk.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The results in this paper demonstrated that the process of technology transfer and
commercialization does not happen overnight. Instead, it requires an equal, clear and sustained
long term commitment underpinning a palpable and defined !nterest on both the demand and
supply sides of any potential relationship. In general, both the quality of the process output and the
overall success potential depend mainly on the satisfaction ot this condition - among other
considerations - in addition to a keen appreciation of the relative degree of control of the
CommTech process.
Basically, the CommTech methodology was applied in a diw_.rse R&D organization with a sizable
scientific and engineering population. The limits of the methodology were not explored. The first
cycle was developed, introduced and managed by one progrzm manager. Given this, it is possible
that a larger scale of input and output can be produced and successfully managed with the proper
application of additional program management resources. Certain activities in Stage 1 and Stage 2
(phase II and III, in particular) might benefit from more specialized and focused support.
The goal of demonstrating the potential advantages of a "low-cost/high productivity" demand-
driven technology transfer model was accomplished - along with all corresponding objectives.
This can be seen in the results summarized in Table 1. The CommTech methodology
demonstrated the potential to be an efficient, productive, measurable, and manageable
process/model. Nevertheless, the potential for improvement is very evident. In addition, the
results indicated that a pro-active, demand-driven approach nfight produce improved performance
and more traceable results than traditional supply-driven methods. Although this was not
conclusive, it was clear that the overall performance of a technology transfer program can be
maximized if it was appropriately balanced around a mix of both pro-active, demand- and supply-
driven components.
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With regardto improvedperformance,theauthorthinksthatthecontrollablesuccessfactors
mentionedearlierneedtobe identifiedandadjusted.Of particularimportanceis thematterof
(potential)non-aerospaceclients' (early)awarenessof Lewis' availability. It ispossiblethat,given
more(programsupport)leadtime, combinedwith moreinformationaboutCommTechobjectives,
theNASA TechnologyTransferNetworkmightprovidemoreeffectivesupportin thisarea. In
addition,theproductivityof theCommTechapproachmightbeenhancedif a travelbudgetwere
availablefor leadS&E's to visit with selectcompaniesandobtainaface-to-faceunderstandingof
theirrespectiveproblemsor needs.Thisadditionalpubliccost/investmentexpenditurewould
probablyresultin higherquality interactionswhichmightin turnproduceabetter,moreproductive
relationshipsandagreements.
It wasalsoobservedthattheability to employtheCommTechapproachmightbeenhancedif
publicfundscouldbeallocatedto demonstratetechnologiesandcapabilities,andbe treatedmoreas
"patient"(public)capital. Thiswouldallow thesefundsto be investedin establishingtechnology
transferrelationshipsinsteadof beingforcedto conformto atraditionalfinancialmanagement
protocol(commit/obligate/cost)designedto ensuretheefficiencyof government-to'-industry
procurements.
Thetraditionalgovernmentprocurementsystemplacesanunnaturalpressureon thepublic sideof
thetechnologytransferelationshipbuildingprocess.In otherwords,thepresentfinancial
managementsystemneedsto recognizethattherateof relationshipdevelopmentisunderprivate
(andnotpublic) sectorcontrol. Giventhis fact,it wouldclearlybebetterif public sector
technologytransferexpenditurescouldbemadeto operatemorelike strategic,long-termeconomic
investments- inteadof standardprocurementactions.CommTech- andtechnologytransfer
programsingeneral- wouldbetterthriveandexhibitincreasedefficiencyandproductivityin a
financialmanagementenvironmentwhichwasmoreaccommodatingto thespecialcharacteristics
of technologytransfer.
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